Several researchers have noted that the WST is not a mere logical reasoning task. Therefore, the task may have two aspects: interpretation of the conditionals and decision making in regard to which cards to select. More recently, the WST has been acknowledged as a task that enables us to explore dual processes of thinking. In the WST, System 1 processes compete with System 2 processes in determining the choice of cards. Heuristic processes are rapid, parallel, automatic, and effortless. They PI-103 involve the allocation of selective attention towards the matching cases A and 3 and deem the other irrelevant. This allocation implies triggering the intuitive response that is not logical. The implication of these heuristic processes in the WST has been corroborated by Roberts and Newton. Although authors found that reasoners�� responses in a rapid response time task did not radically differ from responses given in the free response time version, they also found an increase in the selection of the matching 3 card in the rapid response time task. The rapid response time condition permitted the activation of System 1 processes and the free response time condition did not permit the activation of System 2 processes. Reorienting reasoners�� knowledge using questionnaires is a way of constraining the possible range of misinterpretations, and it guides them to a logical interpretation in which they can reason correctly -. Osman combined a tutoring procedure based on identifying and modifying the misinterpretations reasoners had of the task and time constraints. The tutoring was based on the same version of WST that was used in pre- and post-test. She observed that this tutoring is effective when available cognitive resources are reduced using rapid response or rapid presentation task, opposed to a condition without tutoring. System 1 can no longer trap them even when they are placed in a rapid response time condition. To solve the WST, the reasoner requires hypothetical thinking to select cards A and 7 that only System 2 could ABT-199 provide. Therefore, there would be a conflict between heuristic and analytic output. This conflict-monitoring in dual reasoning processes has recently been examined by De Neys and collaborators. These authors showed that people detect the conflict between the output of the two systems and argued that reasoning errors occur not because people failed to monitor System 1 but because they failed to inhibit the pre-attentional response given by System 1. The present article focuses on the assumption that people without gaps in normative logic could still be poor inhibitors.